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The paper develops a mathematical programming model for assessing the impact of 
Environmental Policy instruments on French winegrowing farm’s adoption of pesticides-
saving technologies. We model choices with regards to investment in precision farming and 
plant protection practices, in a multi-periodic framework with sequential decision, integrating 
uncertainty on fungal disease pressure and imperfect information on equipment performance. 
We focus on recursive models maximizing a Utility function. These models are applied on a 
representative sample of 534 winegrowers from the French Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN). As expected, both ecotaxes and green subsidies make precision farming equipment 
more profitable, but the investment rate remains however low and concentrated on basic 
systems. One explanation is grower’s financial constraint in a context of market crisis and 
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1  Introduction 
The European Pesticides Framework Directive (2009/128/EC) makes it mandatory for all Member 
States to establish national action plans, involving all the relevant stakeholders in the process and 
creating the necessary conditions for implementing integrated pest management that will become 
mandatory as of 2014. Moreover, protection of the environment could be enhanced by the use of 
precision farming technology aiming at reducing pesticides loss in the environment, such as low spray 
drift equipment, variable rate dosing, remote sensing and information technology (IT).  
The advantages of new technologies in precision viticulture and particularly for spraying have been 
extensively studied in international agricultural engineering research (Arnó et al., 2009; Lamb et al., 
2004; Llorens et al., 2010; Tisseire et al., 2007). For example, French engineering research teams have 
recently completed field-oriented studies on precision spraying within the AWARE (De Rudnicki et al. 
2009, 2010; Ruelle and De Rudnicki 2009), OPTIDOSE (Davy and Heinzlé, 2009) and OPTIPULVE 
projects (Heinzlé and Florent, 2010).  
In assessing sustainable farming technology, capital budgeting studies concentrate on farm size and 
profitability thresholds, whereas economics reveal how important are farmer individual characteristics, 
training, risk and uncertainty (Adrian et al., 2005; Greiner et al, 2009; Marra et al., 2003). Risk may be 
linked to the new technology as the new equipment may not have the expected maximum 
effectiveness, its performance being distributed around an average value. Uncertainty is mainly related 
to lack of farmers’ information that could not make probabilities without references. Moreover, 
training plays a great role in adopting new technology as without skills farmer could not fully benefit 
from this new technology (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001; Zilberman et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, plant protection management requires decision to be made at times when the outcomes 
or implication of application decisions will not be known (Rae, 1994). This problem can be then stated 
in term of Decision Theory involving specification of possible actions, states of nature probabilities 
and utility function to maximize considering the farmers rational decision making. Moreover, the 
methodology of economic optimization is the more relevant for analysis of investment and practices 
changes because of the possibility it offers decision makers to substitute alternative strategies (Hazell 
and Norton, 1986).  
Mathematical programming models are widely used since they are able to capture the core decision-
making processes and have the unique ability to link economic elements with ecological and 
biophysical elements (Buysse et al., 2007). We assume here that the farmer has got all the information 
needed for deciding to invest or not and that skills are immediate without any additional costs although 
real performance of the equipment is considered to be unknown before the purchase.  
Many studies can be found in engineering literature on precision farming (PF) but only very few 
studies have examined the costs of investing in PF in comparison with the benefits expected (Godwin 
et al., 2003; Tozer 2009). No study has addressed so far the assessment of cost and benefits of PF 
applied to spraying equipment or has explored means for promoting such equipment. Few studies have 
questioned the winegrape sector (Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998; Ugaglia et al. 2008). The objective of this 
study is then first to propose a modelling framework for assessing farmers choice in PF equipment and 
plant protection strategies. We analyse then the effects of canonical Environmental Policy instruments 
such as taxes and green technology targeted subsidies for promoting the adoption of such equipments.    
 
2  Model formulation 
To assess investment decision in precision spraying equipment, we developed a Discrete Stochastic 
Programming (DSP) model (Aplan and Hauer, 1993; Birge and Louveaux, 1997). Stochastic models 
are appropriate when data evolve over time and decisions need to be made prior to observing the entire 
data stream.    4
Since Rae’s seminal papers (Rae, 1971a, 1971b), DSP has been widely use in the field of agricultural 
economics, especially to model farmer’s responses to climatic uncertainty (Cortignani, 2010; Jacquet 
and Pluvinage, 1997; Kingwell et al., 1993; Maatman et al., 2002). 
Following Birge and Louveaux (1997), the problem is:  
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Where y is the second stage decision vector (vector of second stage variables corresponding to choice 
made after the random event), turning then to the deterministic equivalent program: 
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For vineyard plant protection (mainly fungal diseases), the farmer has to choose between different 
protection strategies or decision rules (Léger et al., 2007). Furthermore, he has the opportunity to 
invest in PF systems equipment allowing a better spraying and a reduction of pesticides application 
rate. We retained two levels of plant protection strategy (s0, s1) corresponding to the two main levels 
identified by the winegrowing experts consulted. Strategy s0 represents systematic applications 
allowing permanent vineyard protection against pests and diseases, while s1 corresponds to reasoned 
spraying applications following broad regional indicators and some field monitoring. We did not 
consider “integrated winegrape production” or organic farming. The first strategy was dropped 
because differences with s1 concern mainly weed control and because of the difficulty to identify 
specific costs, practices such as leaf or cluster thinning being also used to address wine organoleptic 
quality. We dropped organic farming too because of the lack of reliable information and limited 
surveys on practices and production costs. We could stress that in 2006, when a national survey has 
been carried out, 90% of the vineyard was under strategy s0 or s1, s1 being by far the dominant strategy 
(Agreste, 2006) with 76% of the plots.  
For PF equipment, the grower has different options (See table 2 and Appendix 3). Investment can be 
made either with borrowing either cash, respectively named I1 and I2.  
Decision maker has then to choose between 22 decision alternatives (Figure 1). Problem is then to find 
a model that allows foreseeing what will be the choice of the farmer for his plant protection strategy 
and how he will react to random parameters by choosing the objective function to maximize.    5
 
   
Figure 1 - Set of possible solutions for activity 
analysis 




2.1  Random events  
We decide to take interest in three random parameters: infection pressure (ip), farm cash balances (Cb) 
and equipment performance (perf). We name sc_ip, sc_Cb, sc_perf, the scenarios linked respectively 
to these three parameters. The disease pressure of the current year is the combination of the inoculum 
status of downy/powdery mildews and botrytis and of weather conditions. When a year with a low 
pressure occurs only little damage can be noticed on plots where no fungicide has been sprayed. 
Conversely, when pressure is high, the entire yield can be destroyed in the absence of applications. We 
limit the levels of pressure at three with high (h), average (av) and low (l) levels. Although 
probabilities may be conditional on the outcomes of the random pressure of previous stages, we assign 
equal probabilities to outcomes because of the present lack of reliable information on pressures for 
long time periods. The percentage of pesticides saving obtained with the new equipment is supposed 
to be unknown by the farmer when purchasing the equipment. We assume that the performance of the 
PF system follows a distribution that we formalize in three classes marked out by the first and third 
quartiles. Therefore low and high level have a probability of 25% and average level a probability of 
50%. These references come from French engineering research institutes trials on precision spraying 
equipment and information technology (Davy and Heinzlé, 2009; De Rudnicki et al. 2009, 2010; 
Ruelle and De Rudnicki 2009; Heinzlé and Florent, 2010). Moreover, we consider that performance 
level remains the same between the years of the equipment use period. Third random parameter is 
related to the payoffs stream of the year (that we approximate by the turn-over) and includes all 
random events that do not relate to plant protection. This part can be connected to weather conditions 
(hail, sunshine …), to others factors influencing the quality of the grapes or to market conditions 
(fluctuation of wine prices, etc.).  
For taking into account all random events, we distinguish scenarios pertaining to the infection pressure 
and scenarios pertaining to the income balance. Scenarios for the probabilistic analysis are detailed in 
figure 2 for infection pressure and are similar for the income balance. Number of scenarios increase 
exponentially with the number of years.    6
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 scenarios. We note Ysc the income linked with a random event sc=(sc_Cb, 
sc_ip, perf).   
 
2.2  Expected income model 
First modelling aims at maximizing the sum of the expected payoffs of the farmer on several years. We 
use then the Expected value of random events equivalent to the expected value of the farm income as 
the recourse problem is a simple linear function. For the value function, we use the Audsley and 
Wheeler (1978) procedure to calculate the annual cost of PF equipment using actual cash flows 
(Audsley and Wheeler, 1978; Musser et al., 1988). We decide to differentiate the number of years the 
equipment is owned/used and the term of the loan if the equipment is purchased by borrowing (Ford 
and Musser 1994). In order to better represent financial capacity of farms for investing in PF, we 
added additional constraints representing credit rationing. For deciding if the farm can get a loan or 
not, we consider last farm income minus minimal household consumption and liabilities. Thus only 
positive revenue could have access to loan or buy cash saving then on loan cost, interests and 
commissions. Details of the model are given in Appendix 1. 
 
2.3  Utility Function 
For assessing the number of farms that should have always interest in investing in PF equipment and 
/or apply the strategy s1 whatever the state of nature, we model the worst and best of cases maximizing 
the Income variable allowing then to bound the problem. All the random events do not have to be 
calculated. We choose the worst and the best solution for each income, infection pressure or equipment 
performance. For the worst of cases it comes down/amounts to maximize income Y such that     
sc YY s c ≤∀  with sc: scenario and for the best of cases by maximizing the income variable such 
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∑  With M an upper bound on the difference between the minimum and the maximum incomes. 
Farmer’s preferences among alternative farm plans are based on the expected income E[Y] and 
associated income variance V[Y] (Hazell and Norton, 1986). When the utility function is of the 
exponential form 1
Y e
β − − and Y normally distributed then 
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Because of a scale problem with the variance, we focus on the deviation standard and calculate it on 
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Calculation of the objective function is very long as we have for the 3 infection pressure levels, 243 
scenarios on five years and 3125 scenarios for five levels of cash balance leading to 243*3125*3 = 
2,278,125 scenarios.    7
2.4  Financial constraints 
The economic situation of grapegrowers seriously limits new investments. Since the early 2000’s, the 
French wine chain has been facing a market crisis. Expert’s reports assert that this crisis is structural 
rather than conjunctural, pointing a declining domestic market, the growing competition from USA 
and the Southern hemisphere in export markets, and a slow adaptation of French growers (Hannin et 
al., 2010; Heijbroek, 2007). Many growers only stay in business with off-farm income or by using 
European partial vine pulling subsidies. FADN data shows that 14% of growers had a negative average 
operating profit over the 2002-2006 period, 51% had at least one year with negative operating profit 
during that five years period. Contrary to previous crisis that where specific to Southern France, the 
new crisis has been affecting nearly all French regions, even iconic places like Bordeaux or Burgundy. 
Financial constraints are another problem for growers. They are explained by credit rationing coming 
from asymmetric information between small enterprises and their lenders (Maurel and Viviani, 2010). 
They are often important in agriculture (Barry and Robison, 2001). When capital markets do not 
operate perfectly, that is when banks base their lending decisions on available collateral or financial 
ratios rather than projected profitability, farmers are likely to face credit constraints and their 
investment will be sensitive to cash flow (Benjamin and Phimister, 2002). In their crop allocation or 
technological choice, farmers may therefore prefer regular incomes over irregular ones (Bocquého and 
Jacquet, 2010). Empirical studies show that French banks do use financial ratios such as debt to equity 
ratio for credit access to winegrape growers (Cadot, 2008). Following farm decision literature, we 
implemented cash balance and liquidity constraints (Bocquého and Jacquet, 2010; Louhichi et al. 
2004; Ridier and Jacquet, 2002).  
 
2.5  Multi-period modelling 
In the Expected income model, decision is made on a one year-basis. In order to model the evolution 
of the equipment with time, we developed a recursive and a dynamic multi period model. In the new 
models we take into account the variation of the levels of subsidies and the variable costs which were 
constant in the first models. Only the recursive model and its outcomes are presented further. It 
founded out indeed that the dynamic model needed much longer time for resolution than the recursive 
model and outcomes were similar.  
We repeat each year and during n consecutive years, the farmer decision formalized by the Expected 
income model presented. In order to know which decision will be made the year n, we should consider 
factors of the preceding year such as the farm cash balance, disease pressure and investment or not in 
PF equipment and the percentage of recycling Plant Protection Product (PPP). Financial constraints 
change as well throughout the years because of the cash balance changes (see 2.5). For resolution we 
chose to enumerate the set of solutions that changes as the years go by depending of the choices that 
have been made previously.  
We use the following algorithm: 
Loop for N years 
Computation of capBore and capCashe 
Solution of models (expected income, Worst, Best, Mean-Std deviation) 
Computation of To (turn over) and predY (preceding farm revenue)   
Change of sets of possible solutions 
End of loop 
Models have been developed with GAMS and solver CPLEX10. GAMS (General Algebraic 
Modelling System) is a modelling system for mathematical programming problems (Brooke et al, 
1988) consisting of a language compiler and a set of integrated solvers.  
   8
3  Data 
For simulations, we used different data on winegrowing farms and plant protection practices. Source 
and description of data are detailed in table 1. Farm economic and financial information comes from 
the Panel Data of the French Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)
1. In our sample of 534 
winegrowers followed between 2002 and 2006, there is a strong inter-firm and interregional 
heterogeneity. For example, the size of vineyard goes from 0.8 to 148.8 hectares (mean: 20.8; σ: 17.4). 
The average 5 years turn-over goes from 7,270 to 1,993,337 € (mean: 208,747; σ: 215,279).  
Data on pesticides could not be used as FADN does not report physical information and even don’t 
differentiate expenditures by active substance or Plant Protection Products category (herbicides, 
fungicides, insecticides). Therefore, real application rate and commercial products are extracted from 
the Winegrape cultural practices survey conducted by the Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries on 
5216 vine plots in 2006. We aggregated information at the local scale, with 23 wine places such as 
Médoc, Libournais, Côtes and Entre-deux-mers in the Bordeaux region. Within these areas, growers 
face similar pests and climatic environment and have comparable production systems (grape varietals, 
vine density, yield, trellising system …). We calculated the average application rate by area, allowing 
then to apply different kind of taxes on pesticides, either on commercial products either on active 
substances. We also used the Input costs in Viticulture and Oenology data base
2. We discriminate the 
herbicides from the other pesticides, as herbicides are applied with different equipment than those used 
for canopy spraying and therefore not concerned with application rate reduction. The simulated 
average pesticides cost is 414 €.ha-1 (82 € for herbicides and 331 € for fungicides and insecticides), 
ranging from 129 to 825 €.ha-1. 
 
Table 1: Data description.  







Data of 534 French 
wine grape farms 
over a 5 years 
period. 
Farm Accountancy Data Network. 
Quality wine, Wine other than 
quality. French Ministry of 
Agriculture (Agreste, 2002-2006).  
 
Vine and other crops area, 
production, turn over, labour, 
costs, land and buildings, stocks, 








Local. 2006 survey 
of 5216 vine plots 
in the main 
winegrowing 
regions. 
Winegrape cultural practices 
survey. French Ministry of 
Agriculture (Agreste, 2006).  
Vine density, yield, cultural 
practices, use of herbicides, 
fungicides and insecticides 
(Frequency, date of application,  





Input costs in Viticulture and 
Oenology 35th edition and 
following (Bonet et al., 2006). 
Plant Protection Products, unit 
costs, active substance., official 
application rate  
 
To assess investment, we considered five precision spraying systems named A, B+, B, B- and C. 
(Table 2). Appendix 3 provides a brief description of these PF systems. Choice D refers to the no-
investment in PF, the farmer keeping his equipment used presently.  The systems are taken from 
commercially available packages and costs data come from Cemagref Montpellier. Because of the 
range of market purchase prices for this PF equipment, the median of the price range was used. 
Fungicides savings data comes from field trials recently conducted by the French Institute of Vine 
(Davy and Heinzlé, 2009; Heinzlé and Florent, 2010) and Cemagref Montpellier (De Rudnicki et al. 
2009, 2010; Ruelle and De Rudnicki 2009). 
 
 
                                                 
1 FADN http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/index_en.cfm. 
2 The data file has been compiled by INRA Montpellier during a previous study (Mezière and al., 2009) and 
kindly provided to us.   9
Table 2: Technical references for Precision spraying systems. 
Low Med High
C: basic 3500 5% 10% 20%
B-: tunnel sprayer 10000 5% 15% 30%
B: tactical control 20000 10% 24% 41%
B+: spatial control 35000 15% 32% 51%




* See details in Appendix 3. 
Sources: Costs data: Cemagref Montpellier. Fungicides savings: field trials 
of French Institute of Vine and Cemagref Montpellier. 
 
Excepted for Plant Protection Products, information on plant protection strategies is scarce particularly 
on incidental expenses with strategy s1. With a reasoning strategy for application, farmers reduce 
application rates, especially the years with low fungal diseases pressure. Neither this information on 
reduction rate nor probabilities values for the infection pressure is available to date. We consider 
nevertheless constant additional expenses of 100 €.ha
-1 for strategy s1 corresponding to information 
procurement, training and extension services. Similarly, we chose to adjust the application rates 
depending of the level of downy/powdery mildews and botrytis (Table 3). 
 
Table 3:  Pesticides rate adjustment according to fungal diseases pressure. 
Strategy s0 s0 s0 s1 s1 s1
Diseases pressure Low Med High Low Med High
Application rate (1=ref.) 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.8 1 1.2
  
 
Comparison of models 
Results concerning strategies from the Expected income, Worst of cases and Best of cases models are 
presented in table 4. From the sample used in this study, analysis has been extrapolated to all the 
vineyard farms of France using the weighting provided by the FADN. As we could expect, with worst 
and best of cases functions, optimal strategies are respectively s1 and s0 for all the farms. With the 
average and Mean-Standard deviation functions, all the farms except one chose the s1 strategy. This 
result underestimates very likely the reality of farms plant protection strategies. From the Winegrape 
cultural practices survey (Agreste, 2006), we know indeed that s0 strategy which is mainly represented 
in the Champagne region represents though 14% of the group of farms. 
 
Table 4: Models outcomes on the strategy choice. 
model Worst (safety first) Best (optimistic)
strategy S0 S1 S0 S1 S0 S1
sample 1 533 534 534 1 533
population 64 24026 24090 24090 64 24026
percentage 0,3 99,7 100 100 0,3 99,7
Expected income Mean-STD Utility
 
 
Table 5: Models outcomes on the investment decision. 
model
s t r a t e g y DCDCDCB -D C
sample 473 61 523 11 422 107 5 476 58
population 22064 2026 23752 338 20153 3789 149 22166 1924
percentage 91,6 8,4 98,6 1,4 83,7 15,7 0,6 92 8
Expected income Worst (safety first) Mean-STD Utility Best (optimistic)
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4  Assessment of Environmental Policy instruments  
To foster reduction of the use of pesticides amongst vineyard growers, we intend to study the impact 
of canonical Environmental Policy instruments based on ecotaxes and “green” subsidies. Models are 
used to first assess the effect of taxes which by increasing pesticides application costs make then 
investment in PF equipment economically more interesting. Since 1996, Denmark has a differentiated 
levy on pesticides (Hoevenagel et al., 1999). The percentage of tax is nowadays 54% of the retail price 
for insecticides, and 54% for herbicides and fungicides. The non-point source pollution tax set by the 
French Water Law and collected on pesticides sellers by regional Water agencies since 2008 is based 
on four categories of actives substances, depending of the environmental impact: in 2010, the levy is 
5.1 €.Kg
-1 for category I (Toxic, very toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic for reproduction), 2.0 € 
for category II (Harmful for the environment), 0.9 € for category III (Mineral substances harmful for 
the environment) and 0.0 for category IV (Other active substances). Only results with the French water 
law tax are presented here.  
Computation with data from input costs and winegrape survey shows that the actual tax pressure on 
French winegrowers is low, 4% on average, or 18 €.ha
-1 for a PPP spending of 432 €.ha
-1. To change 
behaviour, tax should be much higher. In the DSP simulation, we set up six different levels of Water 
law tax: t0: no tax; t1: actual tax; t2: t1*3; t3: t1*10; t4: t1*30; t5: t1*100.. 
Subsidy to investment in pesticides saving technology is another incentive to encourage PPP 
reduction. Since 2007, a French governmental program supports 40% of investment cost, with a 
ceiling of 30000 € by farm. We simulate six different levels of support: sb0 (no subsidy), sb1 (40% of 
investment cost, with 30000 € ceiling), sb2 (60%), sb3 (80%), sb4 (40% with 60000€ ceiling), sb5 
(40% with 100000 € ceiling). 
Effects of taxes and green investment subsidies with the Mean-STD Utility model are presented in 
Appendix 2 and summarized in figures 3 and 4. More results could be found in Souville (2010). 
Without public incentive, only the basic system C is profitable for a significant number of 
winegrowers, more than 10% of the sample (Figure 3, t0). As expected, the number of farms investing 
in PF technology increases with the level of taxes. Nevertheless, amongst the five systems appraised, 
the basic system C remains by large the most widely adopted. The other systems remain generally too 
expensive for winegrowers, even with a relatively hard tax pressure (note that the B- system is never 
chosen). 
There is a serious concern about the social acceptability of higher taxes. Last, we can notice from tax 
t5, the reversal of the trend because of increasing financial constraints: the highest the level of taxes is, 
the most active they are; however, if fiscal pressure raises too much, shortage of profits constraints 
investment.  
With green investment subsidies (Figure 4), there is no more taking on farmer’s income and therefore 
no activation of credit access constraint. We see that increasing the rate of subvention (sb2, sb3) is 
more effective that the subsidy base (sb4, sb5). However such program is supported by public 
founding and leads to a suboptimal level of PPP use (Baumol and Oates, 1988). A tax scheme with 
compensation would be another more efficient instrument. 
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Figure 3. Results of an increase in French Water law tax (differentiation by toxicity). 
















































Figure 4. Results of a green investment subsidy. Legend: sb0 (no support), sb1 (40% of 
investment cost, with 30000 € ceiling), sb2 (60%), sb3 (80%), sb4 (40% with 60000€ ceiling), sb5 
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5  Conclusion  
In order to assess the potential adoption of pesticides-saving technologies by French winegrowing 
farms, we elaborated a Discrete Stochastic Programming model and conducted microsimulations on 
FADN and plant protection practices data. The main result is that only the basic precision spraying 
systems available will be adopted by a significant number of winegrowers, even with strong 
governmental incentives. French farms are generally too small for high-tech systems that need larger 
vine acreage to spread investment costs. These systems are probably more suitable for agricultural 
subcontractors or for larger US, Australian or South African estates. Moreover, with taxes on 
pesticides, liquidity constraints on farms are increased; however, the cash balance and credit 
constraints could be further formulated more smoothly than it is presently. Another way of modelling 
improvement is to better represent bio-economic relationships; levels of fungal disease pressure used 
in DSP modelling are extremely simplified with three levels with same probabilities whatever the 
geographic area; furthermore these events are translated by a determinist modulation of quantities. 
These limits to models developed so far will be anyhow further overcome with additional 
epidemiologic data. The next step of the work will be then to integrate chronological series on fungus 
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s: strategies, e : type of equipment, n : years 
 
Variables 
Bs= 1 if strategy s is chosen 
        = 0 else. 
I1e or I2e equal 1 if farmer invests in equipment e. I1e= 1 if equipment is bought without 
borrowing I2e=1 if investment with borrowing 
Ie : Sum of I1e and I2e  
, s es e BIB I =×   
 
Constraints 
(1) Only one strategy is chosen.  
(2) Only one investment maximum could be made 
(3) Enables calculation of variable Ie.  
(4) and (5) enable multiplication between Bs and Ie  . 
 
Data  
area     the size of the farm. 
Cpp     the costs of Plant Protection Products used with strategy 1 for a year with average infection 
pressure. 
vCss ,fCss   correspond to the sum of other costs related to one strategy  (like e.g. observation costs, ) with  
respectively one element varying according to the concerned area and another constant 
element . 
Crepe    repair and maintenance costs for equipment e   
Cpure    initial purchase cost for equipment e   






















    Discount rate where g is the inflation rate and r is the interest rate  
   17
Random data 
To     the turnover of the farm for year n 
recs    the percentage of PPP savings (or loss avoided)  




Additional Constraints (6) and (7) 
If equipment is bought with a loan (6) 
( ) 26 I capBor                         e   ee







predY last farm income minus minimum Household consumption and liabilities (minHc). Thus 




If equipment is bought cash (7) 
( ) 1                               e  7
0 if   0 
1 else                    
ee
ee








CB: Cash Balance = To- Cpp –Cs (other costs of the strategy)  
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Appendix 2. Details of model outcomes for taxes and subsidies 
 
 
Table A1. Model outcomes with the Mean-STD model and French Water law taxes  
Taxes DCBB + A s0 s1
t0 sample 476 58 15 3 3
t0 population 22166 1924 64 24026
t0 percentage 92 8 0,3 99,7
t1 sample 472 62 15 3 3
t1 population 22041 2049 64 24026
t1 percentage 91,5 8,5 0,3 99,7
t2 sample 461 73 15 3 3
t2 population 21673 2418 64 24026
t2 percentage 90 10 0,3 99,7
t3 sample 436 95 3 534
t3 population 20691 3322 77 24090
t3 percentage 85,9 13,8 0,3 100
t4 sample 396 131 6 1 534
t4 population 18972 4888 198 32 24090
t4 percentage 78,8 20,3 0,8 0,1 100
t5 sample 406 114 10 3 1 534
t5 population 19473 4131 370 84 32 24090




Table A2. Model outcomes with the Mean-STD model and Green investment subsidies 
S u b s i d i e s DCBs0 s1
sb0 sample 476 58 1 533
sb0 population 22166 1924 64 24026
sb0 percentage 92 8 0,3 99,7
sb1 sample 425 107 2 1 533
sb1 population 20260 3785 45 64 24026
sb1 percentage 84,1 15,7 0,2 0,3 99,7
sb2 sample 388 139 7 1 533
sb2 population 18780 5098 212 64 24026
sb2 percentage 78 21,2 0,9 0,3 99,7
sb3 sample 319 204 11 1 533
sb3 population 15953 7799 338 64 24026
sb3 percentage 66,2 32,4 1,4 0,3 99,7
sb4 sample 425 107 2 1 533
sb4 population 20260 3785 45 64 24026
sb4 percentage 84,1 15,7 0,2 0,3 99,7
sb5 sample 425 107 2 1 533
sb5 population 20260 3785 45 64 24026
sb5 percentage 84,1 15,7 0,2 0,3 99,7  19
 
Appendix 3. Technical references for Precision spraying systems 
 
   D  C  B-  B  B+  A 
   No precision   Price 





(€)    Tactical 
control 
 Price 




  Price 
(€) 
Equipment  Sprayer  Pneumatic     
4 rows 7 km/h 
10000 Pneumatic    
4 rows 7 km/h
10000 Side/side     
4 rows 5 km/h
15000    Side/side     
4 rows 5 km/h
20000 Side/side      
4 rows 5 km/h 
30000 Side/side      




No    No    Yes      Yes    Yes    Direct injection  
3 tanks 
15000 
  Equipment     10000   10000   15000      20000  30000   55000 





No   Fixed  500  On 
traceability 
system 
1000   On 
traceability 
system 
1000 On  traceability 
system 
1000  Fixed + mobile  2000 
 Recommendation 
map 
No   No    No      No    No   Yes    500 
 LAI/NDVI 
measurement 
No   No    No      Pocket 
Sensor 
3000 Pocket  Sensor 3000  On-machine 
sensor 
5000 
 Canopy  geometry 
measurement 
No   No    No      Pocket 
Sensor 
1000 Pocket  Sensor 1000  On-machine 
sensor 
5000 
  Record keeping / 
Traceability   
Manual   Basic  3000 Basic  3000    Basic  3000  Traceability  on   
tractor  




 Data  processing 
software 
No    No   Plot  1000    Plot  2000 GIS  5000 GIS  5000 





  10000     13500     20000        30000     45000     77500 
  Δ with No PF    0        3500        10000          20000       35000       67500 
Fungicides 
savings (%) 
Low-Med-High 0    5  10  20    5  15 30     10 24 41   15  32  51    28 44 61   
Sources: Cemagref Montpellier and French Institute of Vine. 